When a Price Tag becomes a Price Trap

當標價變成價格陷阱

原文網址: Link

摘要： 本文敘述以低價為主打的Tata Nano所遭遇到種種預料之外的困難。事實上，許多品牌會認為打低價就會促進銷售量，但其實不然。有時低價反而會造成顧客對品質的疑慮，還有對產品許多負面的聯想。要如何刺激消費者對產品的熱情才是真正讓銷售量上升的方法。

　　這是第一篇特約部落客─Prasad Narasimhan所發布的文章。他是我們亞洲的經營夥伴，目前在邦加羅爾（印度南部的一個城市）工作。

　　「Tata Nano」的發行在國際汽車市場被視為一項「天大」的消息。在2008年的印度汽車展上，排了將近一公里長的人潮就是為了看它一眼。在大家的心中都有一個疑問：「它看起來會像一輛車嗎？」最後大家都有了一個壓倒性的共識，Tata Nano是一輛「真的很可愛」、「很好看」、「完美」的車子。一輛小車變成了閃亮的巨星！在09年五月開放預購 Tata Nano的時候，全額給付的預售訂單量達到203,000，其總金額高達五億八千萬美金。這一切似乎還會持續從這個基礎成長。然而在2010年11月時Tata Nano的銷售量只有一個月500台。而當時市場上居於領導地位的Suzuki一個月賣出65,000台要價超過5,000美金的入門車款。這一切到底出了什麼問題呢？

　　雖然許多指責指向工廠遲遲無法完工導致供應上的延遲，但是在金字塔底部似乎有更多關於行銷的基本議題值得被探討。價格是唯一著重的特色。然而這在一開始就造成了巨大的影響，這造成了幾個無法預料的結果。

1. 價格便宜的車變成了便宜貨

　　便宜的價格降低了買家感知上的社會地位，買家們認為買一輛比二輪驅動更好的車其首要的動機就是社會地位的提升。因此，當預設的目標族群仍然持續在隔岸觀火，好奇的想要知道它們是否應該把辛苦賺來的錢投資在Tata Nano上時，實際的買家大都是富裕的家庭，他們買下第二輛或第三輛車子給較不常使用車子的家庭成員─主要是退休年長者、家庭主婦。只有20%的基本款預購量，其實就是一個警告：真正的買家並不是預設的目標族群。

2. 標價變成了價格陷阱

　　在發行的前一年就宣布這輛車標價是美金2300。顧客都預期Tata Nano的零售價就是這個價格。但是儘管有突破性的技術，Tata Nano也無法用這個價錢賣出基本款。

因為若是加上許多本來就「應有」的配備，例如：空調設備，那麼價格又會再往上攀升。隨著原物料價格的上漲，Tata Nano完全無法達成對原始價格的承諾。目前基本款的零售價是3100美金而配備升級款則是4600美金。

3. 一半的價格，品質也只有一半？

　　一家四口擠在摩托車上危險的平衡是常見的情景，這激發了Tata Nano希望能夠讓大家都擁有安全的汽車願景。雖然Tata Nano是希望成為對二輪驅動駕駛人一個更安全的選項，但是它在汽車基本安全這部份卻是失敗的。這輛車很小，置物箱給人的感覺很不好而且很塑膠感。更糟的是，據報導有些Tata Nano發生失火意外的機率很高。大家對於Tata Nano的意見顯而易見─Tata Nano很便宜，沒品質，而且不安全。

3. 太專注在價格上讓其他可能的特色失去嶄露頭角的機會

　　「小」可以在像印度等路很窄小的地方成為優點。 Beetle 和 Mini就是兩個這種環境下所激發出來的典範。像 REVA這樣的品牌將顧客的購買慾望及喜歡程度，建立在產品設計具有高度環保意識上。但是選擇價格做為主要特色的話就意謂著有許多其他可以發揮的優點無法被發掘。

　　Nano的失敗給想要以低價位的滲透手法將目標鎖定在消費金字塔底端的品牌廠商們一個及時的警告。商人們總是假設有一大塊未被注意到的市場，這塊市場正在等待的就是低價位。可是事實上人們並不真的購買。利用價格當做顧客最主要購買理由的品牌將會一再地失敗。有人還記得印度曾經推出過低價的電視嗎？ Sansui、Akai、Aiwa都已經消失很久了。ITC想要用低價但卻較小的香菸打敗beedi（手捲菸）也失敗了好幾次。

　　另一方面而言，提供附加價值較多的品牌，可以深入顧客的內心，也因此擁有金字塔底下廣大的顧客群。Nokia其中一款手機「made for India」，耐用的機型帶動了印度手機的革命。它提供了與使用者使用環境與習慣相關的許多特色，例如：手電筒（在鄉村地區電力來源一直是個問題）、為了潮濕氣候使用橡膠處理過的鍵盤、多重的登錄地址滿足多重的使用者、不同語言模式迎合印度人口的語言多樣性。Dell提供客製化的電腦讓顧客有「恰到好處」的選擇方案，讓它可以穩佔筆電的領導寶座。沐浴乳品牌依照使用習慣在不同的時機推出組合包裝銷售。印度的「Times」也透過提供第一手和世界同步新聞的報紙增加他的讀者。 

　　有趣的矛盾指出，在中印度的人對於遲來的喜悅仍然感到還可以接受（雖然目前正在改變）。他們很希望東西可以準時但仍然願意等待。他們活在希望中，但不會為了渴望而行屍走肉，他們是最有價值的一群顧客，他們緊緊擁抱他們所選擇的品牌。但首先，他們必須被這個品牌激發熱情。就像俗諺說的：「你無法將無價值的東西買給窮人。」 

　　Tata Nano目前提供低利率的貸款選擇，希望能藉此對復甦銷售量有貢獻的作用。目前正在放送一個具有創意的廣告，訴說著Tata Nano是多安全、完美的一部車。若不再著重於基本的議題上，將會離最初的夢想更遙遠。 

This is the first post by guest blogger Prasad Narasimhan, our Managing Partner for Asia who's based in Bangalore. More on Prasad here:

The Tata Nano was touted as the little BIG thing in the international auto market. At the India Auto Expo in Jan 2008, there was a kilometer long queue to take the first look. ‘Would it look like a car at all?’ was the question on everyone’s mind. The overwhelming consensus was it was a ‘really cute’, ‘good-looking’, ‘complete’ car. The little car was the big star! As bookings opened in May’09, Tata got 203,000 fully paid bookings generating $580m cash. Things were expected to grow exponentially from that base. However by Nov 2010, Nano was selling only 500 cars a month. This is in a market where the market leader, Suzuki sells 65000 units of entry-level cars priced over $5,000. What went wrong?

While much of the blame has been pointed at problems in setting up a factory leading to very delayed supplies, there seem to be more fundamental issues relating to marketing to the bottom of the pyramid. Price was the only differentiator. While this contributed hugely to the initial buzz, it resulted in several un-intended consequences.

1. The ‘cheap’ car became a cheapo’s car.

Now, let's assume its a good idea for Covent Garden to have a chunkier soup. But this feels like a small change, not a big one. Which would suggest some difference vs. the core range, but not a lot. But Big and Bold has a whole new graphic style and a new pack format (tub not carton).

This is a good example of how range architecture is about the whole visual design, not just the size and position of the brand name. Sure Covent Garden is there on the pack. But you just don't see it. 

2. The price tag became a price trap.

The price tag of 1 lakh ($2300) was announced years before the car was launched. Consumers were expecting a car that retailed at that price. But in spite of breakthrough value engineering, Tata could never sell even the basic version for this price. And for ‘mandatory’ accessories like air-conditioning, the pricing inched up and up. And with every escalation in raw material prices, Nano was not even able to live up to the original price. The current retail price varies from $3100 for the basic version going all the way up to $4600 for the loaded one.

3. Half the price led to Half the Quality?

The common sight of a family of four precariously perched on a two-wheeler inspired Tata’s vision to move them to the safety of four wheels. While the Nano was meant to be a safer option for the two wheeler riders, it failed to live up to basic expectations from a car on safety. The car is small, has poor pickup and feels plasticky. And to add fire to this, some Nanos caught fire in highly publicized incidents. And the opinion was out on the street - Nano was cheap, low quality and unsafe.

4. Focus on price closed the door on any other possible differentiators.

Small could have been a virtue in India where road spaces are narrow and crowded. Beetle & Mini are two icons that could have inspired possibilities. Brands like REVA have built desire and likeability by taking a high ground on ecological consciousness. But choosing to major on price meant that other possibilities could not be explored.

The Nano fiasco is a timely warning for brands that want to target the bottom of the pyramid by using low price as a penetration tool. Marketers tend to assume that there is a large un-tapped market down there just waiting for lower priced products. But, people are not buying. Brands that have used price as the key reason to buy have repeatedly bitten the dust. Does anyone remember the short-lived history of low cost TVs in India? Sansui, Akai, Aiwa are long dead and gone. ITC failed several times in its attempt to woo ‘beedi’ smokers through cheaper and smaller cigarettes.

On the other hand, brands that have offered relevant value driven by deep consumer insight have expanded the bottom of the pyramid. Nokia’s ‘made for India’ durable phones led India’s cell phone revolution. These offered very relevant features like a torchlight (in rural areas where power was a constant problem), rubberized keypads for the humid climes, multiple address books to cater to multiple users, and language options to cater to the vast linguistic diversity of India. Dell’s offer of customization that enabled a just-right option led it to market leadership as the market for laptops exploded. Shampoo brands promoted usage on special occasions with low priced sachet packs. Times of India expanded readership by offering a world-class newspaper at Re.1.

The interesting paradox in middle India is that people are still OK with delayed gratification (although this is changing). They have big hopes but are willing to bide their time. They live in hope, but are not dying of despair. They are value maximizers, and squeeze value out of the brands they choose. But first, they need to be excited. As the saying goes, “you can’t sell poverty to a poor person”.

The interesting paradox in middle India is that people are still OK with delayed gratification (although this is changing). They have big hopes but are willing to bide their time. They live in hope, but are not dying of despair. They are value maximizers, and squeeze value out of the brands they choose. But first, they need to be excited. As the saying goes, “you can’t sell poverty to a poor person”.